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In order to understand the reason for poor performance of the revenue administration, we 
must first look ‘outside the box’ , beyond the organizational boundaries of the revenue 
administration, and analysis the impact of important environmental factors on its 
performance . 
 
Jit Gill, World Bank (2003)    
 
 
Introduction 
 
The opening quotation from Jit Gill challenges students of tax administration reform to look 
“outside the box”, to reject narrow diagnostics and operational solutions to tax compliance, 
grounded purely in administrative theory and technology fixes, in favor of approaches based on a 
broader political economy of tax administration.  This paper adopts such a broad approach to 
explain and evaluate one of the most important, but least analyzed, tax administration 
innovations of the last two decades. This innovation is the large taxpayer unit, (LTU) along with 
the associated taxpayer segment or client organizational framework for improving taxpayer 
compliance. The increasing reliance on LTUs as a strategic organizational tool in over fifty 
developing and transition countries from Argentina to Afghanistan makes this innovation an 
important topic for public sector analysis.  
 
The classic LTU monitors large taxpayers exclusively through auditing, registration, tax 
accounting, collections, and taxpayer service provision covering more than one type of tax.  
LTUs have facilitated major tax policy reforms, such as adoption of a VAT, as well as the reform 
of administrative procedures, including implementation of self assessment, modern auditing, 
electronic filing of tax statements, and the functional organization of work by first incubating 
these changes.  
 
The LTU have been described as a potential Trojan horse for reform in tax 
administrations that have become seriously dysfunctional or, worse, completely captured by 
corrupt administrators. As such, it has been used as an institutional reform substitute for a semi 
autonomous revenue agency.  Although many of the business processes and service innovations 
begun in LTUs are intended for scaling up to cover the entire tax system lower income countries 
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with weak administrative capacity have experienced difficulties in pursing this path to 
comprehensive administrative reform. The successful reforms incubated in an LTU can 
demonstrate to the tax administration management, who are often hostile to change, that it is 
possible and advantageous to modify systems and procedures.  IMF reports on the LTU stress the 
need to integrate LTU practices into “a broader tax administration reform also aimed at 
improving the administration of the medium-size and small taxpayer” and need to “prevent the 
LTU from being perceived as a ‘parallel’ tax administration ”1. 
 
Most recently, the LTU have been established in a number of developing countries that 
already have a semi-autonomous revenue agency (SARA). This development indicated that the 
LTU can play a complementary role to the broader institution of a SARA. Many SARAs have 
not been able to sustain the improvements in revenue that have been achieved initially, have not 
effectively integrated taxpayer information across tax types and third party information flows for 
systemic improvement of audit, and have not always achieved the major improvements in 
integrity and professionalism that were anticipated from human resource management flexibility.     
 
Some developed countries (e.g., Netherlands) and developing ones (e.g., Pakistan) have 
gone beyond establishing LTUs to reorganize administration around different size segments of 
taxpayers.  The rationale for this approach is that each size group of taxpayers has different 
characteristics and tax compliance behaviors and, consequently, each presents different risks to 
the revenue base. According to this management philosophy, maximizing voluntary compliance 
for each taxpayer segment requires delivering a set of strategies that are appropriate to the unique 
characteristics and compliance issues posed by each group. The extreme heterogeneity of 
business taxpayers in developing countries makes this case persuasive. Many developing 
counties have adopted a hybrid approach, by starting with an overall functional design, but 
subsequently grafted components of the segment approach on to their organizational designs. 
Although many transition countries quickly adopted modern tax legislation in the early 1990s the 
reform of tax administration has lagged substantially behind policy. Transition economies have 
used LTU to facilitate speedy tax administration modernization and to cope with weak taxpayer 
compliance, partially driven by overly generous tax holidays.   
                                                 
1 Baer, (2002) ,p.39 
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Part I of this paper first reviews the spread of LTUs, and briefly describes the experience 
of LTUs in a few selected countries.  This section takes up the question of the LTU as an enclave 
administrative reform versus semi-autonomous revenue agencies and "whole of government" 
reform involving broad based wages, human resources planning and anti-corruption measures.  
Part II examines the emergence of the LTU and its relationships to the remainder of the tax 
administration system in different kinds of developing and transition economies, such as (i) 
capable developing states, (ii) administratively weak but governance improving states, and (iii) 
captured states. The relative success of LTUs can improve our understanding of the enclave 
approach to governance reforms as well as yielding insights that are intrinsic to the challenge of 
improving revenue mobilization. LTUs and their roles in developing country economies can also 
be interpreted through the prism of recent revisionist writings on best policies for the tax mix in 
the presence of a major informal sector and a government sector with a highly constrained taxing 
capacity and high vulnerability to corruption 
 
Naturally, LTUs in developing countries should be evaluated quantitatively in term of 
their stated aim of increasing tax compliance relative to the compliance performance of similar 
countries without LTUs and compliance in the same country before the LTU was instituted.  Part 
III of this paper addresses revenue impacts with a cross sectional econometric investigation of 
the determinants of the C-efficiency of a tax rate point of value added tax including explanatory 
variables that capture LTU treatment effects.  
   
Part I: Environmental Factors Impacting Tax Administration  
 
Tax Administration in Developing and Transition Economies   
Tax administrations in many developing countries  are organized by ‘type of tax’ with 
additional tiers of organization determined by geographic. This design is tied to the  belief that 
close geographic proximity should be maintained between taxpayer and tax collector.  The 
geographic dimension is usually based on circle and zonal offices, where tax officers specialize, 
not in a few specific administrative functions, but in acquiring an intimate knowledge of the 
businesses of those taxpayers whose assessments they finalize. Tax administrative work in such a 
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traditional setting has a low incremental revenue productivity because of inadequate 
specialization of tasks and an inability to concentrate resources on the high risk components of 
the revenue base.  Excessive direct contract between taxpayers and tax officers exposes the tax 
administration to a unnecessary risk of corruption, because final tax liabilities are often 
negotiated at face to face meetings. 
 
This type of tax and geographic approach results in administrative units that are ill suited 
for effective use of information technology and for the monitoring of staff performance. The 
span of subordinate units covered by senior managers is generally narrow, leading to 
unnecessary layers of middle management and little opportunity for functional specialization by 
mangers and their staff. In countries where this organization structure has been retained, 
populations growth and growth of the size of the formal economy implies that the low 
productivity circle office design must be replicated many times. The forces of inertia that cause 
traditional administrative structures to be retained include the lobbying power of civil service 
unions and pressure to keep unnecessary management staffing positions for the promotion of 
middle manager.   
 
 Economies in transition have their own tax administration problems that differentiate 
them from developing countries.  Specifically, transition tax administrations have a culture of 
mutual mistrust between tax payers and the tax authorities; no tradition of voluntary compliance 
with tax legislation; no tradition of appeals to the courts against the decisions of the tax 
authorities ; no tradition of self-assessment, which would shift the burden of appraisal to the 
private sector and reduce administrative demands placed on the tax authorities and a tradition of 
strong tax illusion due to taxes being withheld through bank accounts.     
 
By contrast, modern tax administrations are built around organizational designs that 
facilitate specialization of tasks, integrated decision-making, coordinated implementation of 
policies and business practices, and effective monitoring of overall performance.2  A modern 
organizational structure for a revenue administration will enable senior management to allocate 
routine and standardized work to specialized units supported by information technology, while 
                                                 
2  This argument follows Mintzberg  (1983) .  
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assigning most highly-trained talent to high productivity tasks that require problem solving and 
evaluative skills, such as auditing, evaluation of management information reports, and dealing 
with taxpayer disputes. In practice, these conditions have been met by adopting a functional 
organization to the broad activities of registration, collections and accounting, auditing, taxpayer 
services and enforcement. In the functional model, staff work in specific functions, such as 
registration, information processing, audit, taxpayer education and services, but are involved in 
all types of taxes. The functional approach to work design permits greater standardization of 
similar processes across taxes, facilitates simplification for taxpayers, and enables greater 
productivity to be achieved. Standardizing processes across taxes also facilitates their automation 
and deters malfeasant behavior by staff. But increasingly, the functional approach is being 
combined with the client or tax segment taxpayer design.    
 
Moving to Self Assessment and Functional Organization  
Administrative assessments performed by government tax officers under income tax and 
VAT are costly. Where self assessment is not the norm, the revenue authorities impose 
assessments based on taxpayer declarations and desk audits. After meeting with the taxpayer and 
examination their books of account, discrepancies often form the basis for the negotiation of an 
agreed assessment.  Confronted with high assessment targets, tax officers usually complete the 
majority of assessments in a perfunctory manner, so that the tax administration has only a 
marginal impact on voluntary compliance and tax evasion. Alternatively, revenue targets may be 
achieved by adoption of arbitrary procedures and harassment intended to intimidate taxpayers, 
particularly those with a perceived high ability to pay. The absence of self assessment 
encourages taxpayer disputes and imposes significant compliance costs on taxpayers. The 
extensive contact between tax-payers and tax authorities creates  opportunities for bribery and 
associated loss of revenue.   
 
Self assessment should enable tax administration departments to re-deploy their resources 
in a more productive manner and reduce compliance costs for honest taxpayers. But self 
assessment can poses significant risks.  If it is not implemented properly over the longer term 
self assessment could do substantial fiscal damage. Self assessment is based on the presumption 
that it is possible to achieve a reasonable level of tax compliance by test checking a small sample 
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of returns. The success of the self assessment strategy hinges on taxpayer perceptions.  If the 
taxpayers perceive that (a) the chances of their being caught with continued evasion are high and 
(b) that they would face serious consequences once caught, then the level of compliance will 
rise.  If on the other hand, taxpayers believe that the administrators do not have the capacity to 
detect tax evasion, or that, even if it does succeed in detecting evasion, they can escape 
punishment through bribery, political influence, or tax appellate and court processing delays, the 
compliance level will fall.  The creation of a credible deterrent to tax evasion and the effective 
internal supervision of staff are the joint  key to the success of the self assessment strategy. It 
requires initiatives touching almost all aspects of the management and operations of the tax 
administration departments including office training, new approaches to audit selection, a 
reorientation of departmental resources and legal changes and measures to develop a culture of 
compliance within the broader society.  
 
Many developing countries switched to self assessment during the 1990s, although South 
Asia and much of Africa and East Asia are still in the process  of  implementing such a change.  
Although Ebrill et al. (2002) emphatically advise that VAT should be administered on a self 
assessment basis, many economies in transition have stubbornly rejected this advice throughout 
the last decade and half. The larger countries of Latin America, notably Chile and Argentina, 
implemented functional organization reforms in the 1960 and 1970s with advice and technical 
support from the USA’s Internal Revenue Service. And in the cases of Chile, the modern 
organizational structures and ethos were absorbed so well that internal enclaves of administrative 
excellence have not been required.  However, many developing countries have inadequate 
internal capacity to implement such multi-dimensional administrative change. Hence 
comprehensive tax administration reforms (e.g.: Tanzania, Kenya, and Nepal) are increasingly 
undertaken as multi-year tasks guides with technical assistance funded by external resources.    
 
Coping with Globalization and the Informal Sector   
In an era of globalization the profiles of taxpayers in non-OECD countries can be 
categorized broadly into three diverging groups: (i) large taxpayers who use sophisticated means 
to minimize their tax burden and interact with the tax authorities both as tax collecting agents of 
the government and as taxable clients; (ii) small and medium enterprises in the formal sector 
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who maintain weak accounting documentation of their business activities and ultimately 
negotiate their assessments in an environment that is vulnerability to bribery, and (iii) informal 
sector businesses that may not pay direct taxes but pay indirect taxes through their purchases of 
goods that attracted custom duties and domestic VAT payments. The business operations of large 
taxpayers are complex; they have high transaction volumes and they act as withholding agents  
for the  taxes of other taxpayers. Very often large taxpayers are branches of foreign enterprises or 
they themselves own branches abroad leading to issues of how their global profits will be 
distributed across tax jurisdictions. Large taxpayers employ highly qualified accountants and 
lawyers and sometimes they use forms of avoidance that are difficult to detect, such as abusive 
transfer pricing and thin capitalization strategies. These characteristics make it desirable to 
monitoring large taxpayers with staff having highly specialized personnel in accounting and 
auditing. International constraints that impinge on tax administration of  large taxpayers require 
additional skills, such as implementation of tax treaties with other countries.  However, the very 
different client characteristics of SMEs and informal sector businesses indicate the need to adopt 
t separate approaches with simplified procedures and forms and appropriate changes in the law 
both to facilitate legal use of specialized windows as well as to ensure that enterprises are 
classified to the appropriate tax segment.     
Implication of the Non-Taxpaying Informal Sector  
The presence of large informal sectors in developing countries reflect partially lower 
rates of urbanization, high rates of illiteracy, and government policies promoting informal sector 
industries, but also very high fixed costs of entry into the formal economy.   Aurioll and Warlters 
(2003) have attributed to governments in developing countries a kind of super-rationality to 
explain the seemingly irrational commitments to maintaining high barriers to entry from the 
informal to the formal sector. These barrier impede access to banking credit and legal  
entitlements associated formal status that deters invest and broad based economic growth as 
eloquently explained by de Soto and analyses in the tax mix theoretical  literature by Emran and  
Stiglitz (2003).  In their interpretation, developing countries with weak tax administration capacity 
and revenue organizations that are vulnerable to tax leakages when tax collections are focuses on 
informal sector business or the borderline sector consciously raise barriers to entry in an effort to 
maximize tax revenue without improving tax administration capacity. By generating market 
power, and hence rents, for the permitted entrants, market entry fees foster the emergence of 
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large taxpayers. As barriers to entry they create market power for firms whose rents are 
subsequently captured by the government though direct taxes on monopoly profits at a low 
administrative cost. This argument can also be extended to cover a wish to concentrate rents that 
can easily be harvested in captured state. They note the skewed distribution of tax revenue by 
size of taxpayer turnover. Few taxpayers account for a large proportion of total tax collection in 
developing countries.   
Table 1 
Concentration of tax collection in selected countries—2000
 Number of 
large taxpayers    
 
% of  total 
% of 
revenue 
Argentina 3,665 0.1 49.1 
Benin  812 1.0 90.0 
Bulgaria 842 0.1 51.4 
Hungary 369 0.1 42.1 
Kenya  600 0.4 61.0 
Peru 2,450 0.9 64.9 
Philippines 833 0.2 36.0 
Source: Bodin   
 For instance Baer (2002) reports that 0.4% of tax payers account for 61% of total 
domestic tax collection in Kenya and 57% in Colombia. Aurioll and Warlters advocate the use 
second level counteracting  discrimination to encourage small entrepreneurs to register under a 
special status created for them without having larger large taxpayers doing the same.  LTUs 
could be key actors in this reform by their monitoring of large taxpayers. 
 
Drawing upon the theoretical work in Emran and Stiglitz (2002), Stiglitz (2003) has recently 
argued that the existence of a large informal economy makes the VAT inefficient in most 
developing countries.  Because VAT is a tax on the formal sector impedes development through 
a host of general equilibrium distortions.  Stiglitz believes that developing countries that impose 
a VAT, “perversely encourage production to remain in the informal sector, which often produces 
the goods that are consumed domestically or used as inputs in the developed world.”  As an 
alternative, Stiglitz proposed greater reliance on direct taxes and import tariffs (customs). 
However Stiglitz overlooks the role of tax administration in his analysis. By not endogenizing 
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tax administration effort he wrongly attributes to VAT the main role of causing non-neutrality 
between formal and informal sectors, while ignoring the inequitable tax administration effort 
across taxpayer size segments and neglecting the information complimentarily between company 
income tax and VAT when LTU administrative techniques are effectively employed.3.    
 
Emergence and Spread of LTUs   
Large taxpayer units has spread to over fifty counties by 2004 largely, though not 
exclusively, among the developing economies. This organizational form began in Argentina in 
the late 1970s and were copied by other Latin American countries, notably Peru, Bolivia and 
Uruguay, in the early 1980s. With the encouragement of the IMF and some bilateral donors it 
spread to several smaller African countries in the early 1990s, to transition economies in the mid 
1990s,starting with Hungary, and finally to South and East Asia in the first decade of the 21st 
century.  
In the case of Argentina the focus was made more efficient and systematic in the early 
1990s through the development of a computer-based accounting system, initially for the control 
of compliance with filing and payment for the 2,000 largest taxpayers. This system has been 
progressively extended to cover 230,000 large and medium size taxpayers, although a single 
LTU in Buenos Aires monitors only 3,700 taxpayers who account for approximately 50 percent 
of all revenue generated.  The Argentine large taxpayer software was applicable to all taxpayers 
so that -the LTU in this case performed the role of a “good trojan horse” 4 for improvement.  But, 
as reported by Baer (2002), the strategy failed to meet the needs of small taxpayer because of 
constraints of the tax administration’s. Eventually, the Argentine authorities attempted to 
respond by setting up a simplified tax regime for small taxpayers      
 
Writing for a CIAT technical conference in the early 1990s Vazquez-Caro (1994) offered 
an explanation of the direction and motivation of Latin American tax administration innovation 
during the preceding decade that is well worth quoting. “The rationale for this approach [creating 
                                                 
3 Concern about the appropriateness of VAT for lower income developing countries is not new. Shoup (1988) notes 
that the “VAT is not ideal for all developing countries” and lists several factors which affect this including those 
countries where  retail trade is fragmented among very small traders, discrimination among investment goods is not 
considered harmful, basic accounting is not widespread, and efficient and impartial administration has not been 
achieved.  This problems is dealt with in low income countries with low literacy by establishing a high threshold for 
compulsory participation of dealers in VAT 
4  A phrase suggested to the author by Jaime Vázquez-Caro 
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a segmented unit for large taxpayer] was that the individual importance of {these} taxpayers on 
total collection made a close monitoring decisive.  This focus of collections on a few taxpayers 
derived not only from the high concentration of income in the country, but also because of the 
increasing transfer to the private sector of tasks previously handled by tax officials  From having 
been originally large taxpayers , these companies became large collectors of  withholding  and 
VAT.”  Hence the rise of payroll taxes, public pension plans in the formal sector, and the 
increased dependence on VAT in the Latin American revenue mix has turned large companies  
into major tax collection agents for government.   
 
The inefficient side effects of adopting this attractive solution to the tax collection 
problem was also a substantial loss of interest throughout Latin America  in efforts to achieve an 
equitable rate of compliance by small and medium taxpayer. Vázquez-Caro (1994) cautions that 
the segmentation of the organization based on taxpayers size poses an observational challenge to 
overcome problems of asymmetric information in recognize and monitor taxpayers without 
creating a unit to do so.5 Even at the end of the 1990s this weak compliance record remains a 
major issue in Brazil, where, as identified by Tendler (2002), regional politicians ensure a type of 
informal tax holiday to industrial clusters of SMEs in order to preserve jobs for their 
communities.    
 
Segment or Client Model 
Another alternative recently adopted by a few developed countries such as Netherlands 
and Australia is the taxpayer segment or client model.  Pakistan since 2002  have  attempting to  
implement an authentic taxpayer stratified segment approach,  with different taxpayer service for 
small , medium and large taxpayers.  In order to improve voluntary compliance for each specific 
group of taxpayers, the tax authority needs to tailor and deliver a set of strategies that are 
appropriate to the unique characteristics and compliance issues presented by each group. Such 
                                                 
5  Vázquez-Caro  suggests that the more intense monitoring  in Argentina led to efforts to  the break up of large 
companies and to the pretend dwarf phenomena detected in Mexico.  “Large taxpayers start breaking down into 
smaller units as happened in Argentina, where the large taxpayer unit eroded overtime due to this tendency to stay 
away from the ¨special¨ treatment. To drop out was easy because the rest of the organization--due precisely to the 
emphasis on large taxpayers--was unable to track them to put them back in.”    
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strategies can include targeted audit action, law clarification by public rulings, and specific 
taxpayer education initiatives.   
 
Reasons for Adoption of an LTU   
The most fundamental goal of LTUS according Baer (2002) has been to improve the 
level of compliance among large taxpayers and to act as a pilot or incubation center to test 
administration reforms later extended to the rest of the taxpayers.  Additional reasons stressed by 
Bodin (2002) and dos Santos (1994) are to improve the management of arrears and the speed of  
collections in a systematic monitoring an objective which has major present value revenue 
consequences in economies subject to high rates of inflation. 6 Bodin stresses that LTUs are 
increasingly being employed to support major tax reforms (e.g., VAT) in countries with weak 
administrative capacity, to facilitate allow introduction of major tax administration reforms (e.g., 
function-based organization and self-assessment procedures) and to signal government’s 
commitment to enforce tax laws to the taxpayer community.  A final rationale for establishing an 
LTU is to improve business climate, particularly for direct foreign investment by providing  
sophisticated services such as advance rulings to large clients and to reassure investors that they 
assessment and audits will be dealt with in a fair and transparent manner.  Direct foreign 
investors often fear harassment by tax officials in host countries with a reputation for 
institutional weakness in tax administration. Accordingly, avoiding contact with tax official  
during the first few year of operation following an initial  investment is one reason the DFI . 
Effective LTUs may provide scope for cutting back on tax holidays extended to foreign  
investors ,in part, so that the foreign direct investors did not have to deal with a corrupt regular 
tax administration outside the LTUs. 
The LTU accomplishes its goal though (i) reorganizing from a tax to a functional  
structure, (ii) reducing the potential for corruption by automating and restructuring control 
systems, (iii) strengthening the audit function,  (iv) changing attitudes of officials toward 
taxpayers; and (v) simplifying and reducing paper handling through appropriate use of 
information technology.  The business operations of large taxpayers are complex, and they often 
have non arm’s length  transactions with foreign parent corporation or have branches abroad.  
                                                 
6   
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They resort to legal tax avoidance and aggressive tax sheltering practices more often than other 
taxpayers and use transactions between branches to make monitoring difficult.  
 
The most importantly question surrounding the LTU is whether it can deter corrupt 
practices and administrative malfeasance by  focusing on the few largest taxpayers with the 
resources of a highly training and closely monitored small team of elite tax administrators7.  LTU 
aim to deter revenue officials from negotiating tax liabilities with taxpayers. By concentrating 
scarce tax administration resources, particularly auditing skills, where they are most productive, 
the LTU should be able permit the adoption of more sophisticated tax administration techniques 
such as a functional organization of internal business processes, adoption of self assessment, 
effective provision of taxpayer services, and effective auditing of multinational enterprises 
through competent policing of aggressive transfer pricing practices.  
 
Work flows have been modified in Russia, Ukraine, and Latvia to reduce interaction 
between tax officials and taxpayers. The access of taxpayers is restricted to the taxpayer service 
areas and the public is prohibited from entering other offices. Shifting the processing of returns 
and payments into data processing units that have no public interface has distanced revenue 
officials from taxpayers. The LTU strategy implies the necessity of attracting the best officials to 
a tax unit specialized in large companies and may require an enhanced remuneration policy for 
LTU staff or enhanced career prospects as a  result of having been part of this specialized group.  
                                                 
7 Dos Santos (1994)  recommends that “to prevent deterioration in the quality of service, the large taxpayer offices 
should not control more than about 2,000 taxpayers each”  
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Part II: Alternative Paths to Reform for Tax Administration  
Alternatives Paths to Reform  
Although tax and customs administration reform projects in recent years have had 
country specific variations, most have sought to (i) improve the organization and management of 
revenue administration; (ii) strengthen the legal and regulatory framework; (iii) broaden the tax 
base by registering potential taxpayers; (iv) facilitate voluntary compliance; (v) improve capacity 
to process the massive information flows resulting from declarations filed by taxpayers, payment 
transactions and administrative actions; (vi) enhance availability of information about taxable 
transactions from third parties; (vii) develop risk-analysis capacity to zero in on cases involving 
potential violations of tax laws; (viii) strengthen investigation, audit and enforcement capacity;  
and  (ix) improve appellate procedures. Large scale administrative reforms, that are often 
supported by loans  from development banks have involved considerable experimentation with 
different organizational structures; strengthening of management systems; major changes in tax 
and customs codes; re-engineering of business processes; heavy investments in information and 
communication technologies; improvement of incentive systems; and active efforts to reach out 
to taxpayers and other stakeholders to enhance voluntary taxpayer compliance. 
 
Semi- Autonomous Revenue Agency     
The overall governance of the revenue agency will influence its autonomy in using 
financial resources, hiring and firing staff and taking day to day operational decisions. Different 
countries have adopted varying approaches with regard to the status of the revenue 
administration within the government.  At one pole, Russia, and Kazakhstan have established a 
full-fledged ministry with tightly supervised responsible for tax administration. The Minister has 
a cabinet level status and the same level of autonomy as other ministers.  A number of countries 
have sought radical changes around the ‘how to tax problem’  problem by creating independent 
or quasi-independent Revenue Administration Authorities. This became a key feature of 
governance reforms in Latin America in the early 1990s, starting with Peru in 1991, and 
followed by Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Argentina, and Colombia.  This reform 
also became popular in Africa in the late 1990s, with 12 countries experimenting with Revenue 
Boards or semi-autonomous agencies. In Asia, by contrast, only Malaysia and Singapore have 
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given greater autonomy to their tax administrations, although other countries in the region are 
beginning to discuss and consider this as well. Pakistan is attempting to provide its Central Board 
of Revenue with more administrative freedom to capture some of the  potential benefits of an 
SARA .    
By using this approach, some countries, in particular, Bolivia, Guatemala, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, and Venezuela, have increased performance 
dramatically across a large number of indicators, whereas others have enjoyed more limited 
success. For Africa, the revenue authority model has been instituted in Ghana (1985), Uganda 
(1991), Zambia (1994), Kenya (1995), Malawi (1995), Tanzania (1996), and South Africa 
(1997).  Those with greater autonomy have shown better performance since managers where 
more empowered and they were able to undertake reforms faster and further than those with less 
autonomy.8  Many countries have attempted to use revenue administration restructuring as an 
opportunity to get rid of corrupt officials and unproductive staff who are often political 
appointees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Taliercio, Roberto, 2000, Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment:  The Link between Revenue 
Authority Autonomy and Performance in Latin America, Mimeo. Harvard University 
Case of Peru: A Successful Semi Autonomous Revenue Agency     
 
Peru’s revenue authority was one of the developing world’s most successful examples of tax administration
reform. By the late 1980s, Peru’s tax administration had nearly collapsed and was plagued with corruption.  Tax
revenue had fallen from 14 percent of GDP in 1978 to 9 percent in 1988.  Consequently, the government decided to
radically overhaul tax administration, and the first semi-autonomous revenue authority in Latin America was
established.  The reforms were highly successful with internal tax revenue recovering to 13 percent of GDP by 1997
and 90 percent of large taxpayers surveyed believed tax taxpayer services had improved. The reforms had several
key elements: (i) strong political support coupled with managerial expertise; (ii) granting administrative and financial
autonomy to the institution; (iii) implementing radical personnel reform; (iv) investing in infrastructure and
information technology; (v) and generating public support. To guarantee financial autonomy, a certain percentage of
taxes collected were automatically assigned to the agency.  Management was committed to developing an honest and
professional staff. All staff members were given the option of voluntary retirement or applying for a position in the
new agency  and taking a rigorous exam.  To enhance morale and productivity, the new agency established salaries
based on comparable employment in the private sector. The strategy of coupling the fight against tax evasion with
better taxpayer services and honest administration enabled the institution to develop a constituency of support in the
business community. after its successful start, suffered from decreasing political support for efficient revenue
collection, a decline in the quality of the tax policy framework, and increased interference by the Ministry of Finance
in its autonomy. SUNAT as a consequence has suffered a loss of standing in public opinion.. Revenue collection, at
12% of GDP in 2001, remains far above the pre-reform level.  
 The earliest  LTU began in  Peru  in 1982. Thr  LTU in Lima was assigned responsibilities for the most important
taxpayers nation wide and  it followed  the  Argentina model.    
 
See World Bank (2001), Strengthening Peru’s Tax Agency, PREM Notes, Washington, D.C. and Katherine Baer,
(2002),  Improving Large Taxpayers’  Compliance,       
 16
 
An independent revenue agencies covering all taxes or all taxes, except customs duties, 
have considerable autonomy and have constituted major enclaves for administrative reform in 
countries where the whole of government approach is not feasible. These agencies are typically 
constituted outside the civil service, so that its employee do not have a career path that can  
involve movement between  the agency and the rest of government.  The top management is 
recruited on fixed term contracts. Management has significant independence in financial, 
personnel and operational matters, but is accountable for delivering agreed results.  Due to the 
considerable similarity in functions of tax and customs administrations, some countries have 
experimented with combining tax and customs administrations 
 
Peru has remained the most impressive success story of  a SARA in a low to mid income 
countries that successfully created discontinuity between the corrupt staff and captured 
management of the abolished  agency and the newly recruited staff of the successor SARA.  In 
their place young staff, often straight out of college with academic training concentrated in 
accounting and law were hired. When such a radical departure in personnel is not feasible the 
small enclave approach of the LTU may be more attractive as a vehicle for reform than pursuing  
the SARA path with its much higher associated operating costs.    
 
Reforms of the tax administrations in Tanzania and Uganda under SARA in the 1990s resulted in 
short term revenue increases. But these achievements have proved difficult to sustain in the 
longer run.  After the initial success, revenues in percent of GDP have stagnated or declined and 
the level of fiscal corruption seems to increase. Our research has explored factors that may 
explain this trend. Two factors are highlighted; one is related to the limits of autonomy, and the 
other to patterns of fiscal corruption 
 
In practice, the performance record of SARAs has been mixed: some countries have improved 
performance dramatically across a number of indicators, while others have had difficulty 
attaining the expected results or sustaining initial progress.9 Problems in performance have 
                                                 
9 See Fjelstad, O-H., “Fighting Fiscal Corruption: The Case of the Tanzania Revenue Authority,”    Working Paper 
2002.3, Chr. Michelsen, Bergen.  For a more general country survey and balanced assessment,   , see Taliercio, 
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resulted primarily from the lack of political support, tensions between the ARA and the ministry 
of finance, and poor organizational design, including among others weaknesses in the new 
accountability regime.  Nonetheless, on the whole the record suggests that, with enough political 
push and proper design, Taliercio finds that  the relatively more autonomous revenue authorities 
(Peru, Kenya and South Africa ) have been more adept at increasing  performance than  the less 
autonomous ones (e. g: Uganda, Mexico and Venezuela)   
 
Coping with Corruption in the External Environment   
Even where enhanced wages or special bonuses have been enacted for the staff of the 
LTU or for all members of a SARA and good working conditions prevail, corruption may 
continue to thrive. Corruption in public institutions, particularly revenue agencies, has often been 
conducted through reasonably well-organized networks or bribery pool, where trust and 
reciprocity is found between network members, as described by Rose-Ackerman (1999). Indeed, 
such a parallel informal organization is almost always present in those countries where 
government or large components of government are at risk of capture. How sustainable is 
institutional and integrity reform when the external environment is distinguished by such 
conditions.  According to Terkper (2003) corruption has reemerged as a serious issue in at least 
three of the pioneer SARAs, that is in Ghana, Uganda, and Kenya and Fjeldstad (2003) has 
documented the problems of Tanzania (see box). The continuation of integrity problems also 
suggest that special manpower policies alone may be insufficient because the integrity of 
institutions depends on other factors including national attitudes towards tax compliance, the 
effectiveness of government spending programs, effective operational procedures and detection 
systems (including automation) and a commitment to maintain strong internal vigilance 
oversight, leadership qualities within both the political executive and senior management of 
government agencies, and transparent rules and regulations.   
 
Accountability Mechanisms   
A recent literature, emerging from donor-supported tax administration modernization  projects, 
has drawn attention to the inadequate accountability mechanisms between government and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Robert Jr., “Designing Performance: The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority Model in Africa and Latin 
America.” Unpublished manuscript, The World Bank, August 2003.  
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taxpayers. Such mechanisms have been interpreted by Gloppen and Rakner (2002) as  having 
three components : (i) transparency or the ability of taxpayers to see decision and processes of 
government are derived and implemented in accordance with known rule and mandate, (ii) 
answerability or the obligation to provide legitimate reasons for government decisions and (iii) 
controllability or institutional checks  and control to prevent mismanagement and abuse of power 
and to ensure that corrective measures are adopted when the rule are violated.  Clearly, effective  
transparency, answerability and controllability all require a strong government commitment to 
designing  a framework of clear and consistent  set of rules and a  well understood and 
monoitorable set of performance indicators. This literature advocates building a new of social 
contract to build a voluntary tax compliance relationship between citizens liable to tax and 
government based on transparency, answerability and controllability. It also stresses the need for 
developing countries to undertake efforts to improve the neutrality of tax administration efforts 
across to  the three tax payer segments of  large taxpayers, SME taxpayers and small business in 
the informal economy. It strongly endorses adoption of presumptive tax window for informal 
sector enterprise but takes snot of the reluctance of  LDC  to implement such  approaches . 10     
 
Human Resources, Wage, and Integrity Issues  
Management improvements in  tax administration  require fundamental changes in the 
behavior of managers and staff  and their desire to make effective use of scarce resources to meet 
organizational objectives. In management of financial and human resources, revenue 
administrations are often constrained by laws and regulations that apply to the public sector as a 
whole.  Rules for public expenditure management and staff assignments often reduce the 
flexibility of the revenue administration to move financial resources from one activity to another, 
higher productivity, activity. Traditional tax administrations fail to recognize that globalization 
and the opportunities create by modern information technology requires a new and different skill 
mix in  tax administration.  Revenue administration staff are usually  part of the general civil 
service  and consequently, have very  little leeway to improve their salaries and incentives. This 
                                                 
10 For example the Government of Uganda instructed  its Uganda Revenue Authority in 1998 to implement a 
presumptive income tax on informal enterprises with low turnover . But according to  Gloppe and Rakner (2002) the  
implementation of this process has not been taken up with any sign of commitment because enforcing  collections 
from this segment is not seen as cost effective.       
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poses a particularly difficult problem with regard to recruitment and retention of good managers, 
lawyers, auditors and IT professionals needed to run a modern revenue administration 
 
In order to improve salaries, countries opting for the independent agency model have 
delinked the salaries of revenue administration staff from the general civil service, thus, giving 
management the freedom to pay market salaries. In Guatemala, the salaries of top managers were 
increased very significantly. Other countries, like Jamaica, created a separate salary scale for tax 
administration staff.  Some countries, including Russia and Albania, give managers discretion to 
distribute performance-based bonuses.  Improvements in management information systems to 
support decision-making have been implemented in many reforming countries. In addition, 
automated financial management and human resource management systems have been put in 
place.  Ideally training should  have a goal oriented focus and capacity to meet the change 
objectives of the agency.  In tax modernization efforts in developing countries, the staff 
development  system, is frequently poorly organized, supply driven, not oriented toward the 
specific professional and skill upgrading for the agency.. .  
 
According to Fjeldstad (2003) compensation aspects of institutional reforms in Africa 
should take into account the role of family networks and obligations. Increased pay rates may 
imply more extensive social obligations, resulting actually in a net loss to the individual. This 
state of affairs can develop into a vicious circle with higher wages leading to more corruption 
because the tax officer has to make up for the loss caused by such obligations.  The rotation of 
officials may also give corrupt superiors undue power.  They might ‘sell’ assignments to 
attractive positions or reassign officials to remote stations as a punishment for honesty. See 
Rose-Ackerman (1999).  The scarcity of qualified personnel such as income tax auditors further 
reduces the potential of rotation schemes in the poorest countries.    
The empirical evidence as to whether low civil service wages foster corruption is mixed. 
Findings from cross-country data vary depending on the wage data and corruption data used, the 
countries that are included in the analysis, and the research design. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2000) collected pay data from the ILO, IMF, and country sources for 28 developing and low-
income OECD nations for the period 1982-94. In cross-sectional tests they find that higher pay 
relative to manufacturing wages is associated with less severe corruption, as measured by the 
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ICRG.  However, in other tests that rely only on time-series variation in the data, they find no 
evidence that changes in pay are associated with changes in corruption. Rauch and Evans (2000) 
create a wage measure for 35 developing countries based on country experts' judgments of how 
salaries of higher officials compared to those for private sector managers with similar training 
and responsibility. They find no relationship between this measure and subjective assessments of 
corruption in government as provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and other 
firms.  In their sample of 63 countries (including developing and developed nations) Swamy et 
al. (2001) find no relation between pay (relative to per capita income) and corruption, as 
measured by a graft index constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999)   
Even if a consensus were to emerge that more pay did reduce corruption, the direction of 
causality would be difficult to establish. If corruption takes the form of waiving fees or taxes, or 
increasing procurement costs, there will be fewer public resources available to compensate 
public officials.  Corruption could lead to lower pay, rather than the reverse. There is even reason 
to expect that under certain circumstances higher pay might actually worsen corruption.  At a 
given employment level, higher pay may crowd out other funding necessary for provision of 
services, increasing bribe-seeking opportunities by lengthening queues. 
 The establishment of a proclaimed autonomous revenue authority with comparatively 
generous remuneration packages and substantial budgets does not protect the authority from 
political interference. To the contrary, as observed in Uganda, it may make it a more attractive 
target because the authority offers both relatively well paid jobs and considerable rent-seeking 
opportunities. Consequently, such an authority is vulnerable to political interference, especially 
in personnel matters. First, even with relatively high wages and good working conditions, 
corruption may continue to thrive.  Hiring and firing procedures may lead to more corruption. 
Corrupt tax officers often operate in networks, which also include external actors.  
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The Case of Revenue Administration Reform Imitative in Tanzania       
 Revenue authority model appears to have been less successful in sub-Saharan African countries than in Latin America.   
Tax Administration Project (TAP) was developed in 1998-99 to improve TRA’s effectiveness and efficiency with
significant financial and TA resources support (US$73millions, World bank and five other donors. )   Implementation
was slow in the initial  phases  but has  improved  over time along with the focus  of  the authorities . 
    
After the initial success, revenues in percent of GDP have stagnated or declined and the level of fiscal corruption seems
to increase.  A Commission on the Causes of Corruption in Tanzania reporting in January 1996 identified four factors as
keys to explaining the extent and types of corruption pervasive in  tax administration: (i) political intervention in  the
form of discretionary tax exemptions granted to business people who had the ‘right connections’, (ii) high tax rates and
complicated regulations,  (iii) the potential gain from involvement in corruption could be considerable, both for officials
and taxpayers.  and (iv) poor pay and working conditions. The low wage levels at the tax administration compared to the
private sector invited corruption. The average public employee’s salary including allowances in the early 1990s
inadequate 
 
Reforms of the tax administrations in Tanzania in the 1990s resulted in short term revenue increases. But these
achievements have proved to be difficult to sustain in the longer run. Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) was established
in 1996 as a semi-autonomous tax administration agency.  The choice of a revenue authority model was  intended  to
limit direct political interference by the Ministry of Finance and to free the tax administration from the constraints of the
civil service system including low wages. Adoption  of the  SARA framework  was intended  to attract and retain quality
staff by paying rates above the civil service regulations, and to facilitate dismissals. 
 
Tanzania started to merge income tax and VAT in 2001 with an LTU and plans to integrate other offices in the medium
term. With the arrival of semi-autonomous status wage rates rose substantially,  for some categories of staff up to ten
times higher than corresponding positions in the civil service.  Further emphasis was laid on strengthening accounting and
internal monitoring systems and curtailing the opportunity of tax officers to deal with cases on the basis of their own
discretion. The general scarcity of qualified accountants, lawyers and IT-experts in Tanzania resulted  in inadequate
recruitment of staff with these key  skills within the intake pool of the TRA. Steps were taken to improve working
conditions for employees by improving offices, expanding computer services, purchasing service vehicles.  Internal audit
and vigilance  remained.  Fjeldstad (2003) reports that in December 2000  the TRA management and board took action,
resulting in many vigilance officers being ‘retired in the public interest’.  Secondly, despite a dramatic increase in pay
rates compared with normal rates in the public sector, it was not enough to compensate for the potential gains from
corruption. Assessors are considered to have wide discretionary powers to interpreting tax laws, for instance, to allow or
disallow expenses or charges, or to exempt import duty on items imported  Reforms of tax legislation and procedures,
including measures to improve transparency in the taxpayer–tax officer relations, should therefore take place concurrently
to reduce opportunities for corruption and the demand for corrupt services.. 
 
 In 2003 Tanzania was in the second year of a program of technical assistance, funded by the European Union, in support
of the Large Taxpayer Unit and VAT Department. Part of a continual training component has been a series of
management courses in UK for senior VAT managers covered corporate planning methods and information systems, how
to develop risk analysis documentation for VAT operational systems, and broad management skills. 
As of  2003  the .TRA is still organized as a tax-type organization and tax procedures are not based on self assessment  
According to a recent Fund diagnostics: misallocation of TRA resources, high compliance costs for taxpayers ,
inadequate taxpayer services, duplication of functions, weak compliance strategies remained unresolved issues   
 Taxpayers  Classified  by  Size  Distribution:   
Large taxpayers: 
 500 enterprises = about 70 % of domestic tax collections 
Medium-size taxpayers: 
 13,000 enterprises registered for VAT = about 25 % of domestic tax collections 
Small taxpayers: 
 100,000 small businesses = less than 5 % of domestic tax collections 
LTD should be a model of integrated structure / procedures based on voluntary compliance 
LTD should help secure / improve revenue  collections (from the start of modernization process... ) 
Develop new procedures and computer system in the LTD 
Establish integrated tax offices for medium-size taxpayers ( first in Dar es Salaam) 
Authorities  are evaluating  proposals  to establish new tax offices to administer presumptive taxes  to be paid by small
businesses.   
Sources: Bodin (2003), Fjeldstad (2003) and Crown Agents (Web, 2003)      
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Empirical Evidence on LTU Revenue Productivity Impacts 
 
According to dos Santos  (1994) in Uruguay, large taxpayers showed a late filing rate of more 
than 10 percent before the large taxpayer monitoring system became operational; the rate has 
since been reduced to less than 3.8 percent 
 
Dos Santos (1994) reports that  the large taxpayer monitoring system can improve collection 
results in the short-medium terms. The mere introduction of this system can lead to change in the 
behavior of taxpayers. In a study carried out in a Latin American country in 1992, the change in 
the value-added tax (VAT) paid by 1,400 taxpayers included in the system in 1990 was measured 
for 1989 and 1991.  There was a 22 percent increase in the VAT revenue in constant values (see 
Table  ---).  Economic growth over the same period was 4 percent.  In 1993, a second study was 
made--on additional taxpayers included in the system-- and the results were similar. 
 
Table 2 
. Change in Taxpayer Behavior, 1989-91, After Inclusion in Large Taxpayer 
Monitoring System (Amounts in local currency constant values) 
 
 
SECTOR 
 
NUMBER OF 
TAXPAYER
S 
 
VAT PAID 
IN 1989 
 
VAT PAID IN 
1991 1/ 
 
CHANGE IN 
COLLECTION
S 
 
CHANGE IN 
COLLECTIONS (IN 
PERCENT) 
 
Industry 
 
605  
 
21,181  
 
22,958  
 
1,777  
 
8.39  
 
Trade 
 
627  
 
17,457  
 
24,182  
 
6,725  
 
38.53  
 
Other 
 
155  
 
7,106  
 
8,860  
 
1,754  
 
24.68  
 
Total         
 
1,387  
 
45,744  
 
56,000  
 
10,256  
 
22.42  
Source : Dos Santos (1994)   
 
(To be augmented  with a cross section  econometric  study .)  
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Notes Towards Conclusions  
 
In general, an ARA has more flexibility in managing personnel and finances and more control 
over corporate governance relative to the typical government agency. At the same time, it also 
has clearer and more transparent accountabilities.  Like the independent central bank in the case 
of monetary policy, it was designed to resolve a credible commitment problem: if properly 
functioning ARA signals taxpayers that tax policies and regulations will now be credibly 
enforced.  For the general taxpayer, it means that everyone will pay his “fair” share of financing 
public goods and services.  And. it also means that compliance will be easier because the 
transactions costs of paying taxes would be reduced.  The overall implication thus was that 
collections would increase and service would be more taxpayer friendly. 
 
Campos (2004) suggest that enclave approach to public sector reforms, of which the LTU is an 
important narrowly defined case, may be the only option for success in states with weak capacity 
to implement whole of government reforms. Given the politically reform challenges and 
implementation capacity constraints of overhauling the “whole of government”, for many 
developing countries, enclaves may be the only option with a reasonable probability of success. 
Comprehensive reform approaches strain limited institutional capacity, generate more than the 
tractable level of opposition from any stakeholder, and thus may stall and fall apart before  
reaching their desired ends.  
 
Findings by Levy and Engberg-Pedersen (2004) on the African experience with administration 
reforms in both revenue and expenditure systems suggests that more narrowly focused, strategic 
interventions may be more successful over the long run.  Moreover, among the more narrowly-
focused reforms, the capacity building initiatives focused on accountability were considerably 
more successful than those focused on human resource management.  They conclude that  the 
more technical nature of expenditure accountability reforms may have been less threatening to 
vested interests than the more politically sensitive administrative reforms, and perhaps more 
importantly, that these reforms produce more readily observable results that generate needed 
support from the general public. 
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.Table 3 
Schematic Matrix of Environmental Conditions and Probability of Success of Public Sector 
and Revenue Administration Reform Initiatives        
 
SCOPE OF 
REFORM 
 
SUPPORT FOR 
REFORM FROM 
POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP AND 
EXTERNAL 
STAKEHOLDERS  
 
CHARACTERISTICS  OF COUNTRY  AT OUTSET OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE REFORM 
   Partially 
captured state  
Administratively 
weak governance 
improving  
Capable 
developing state 
A: Comprehensive 
reform 
Strong 
 
Partial 
Unsatisfactory   
 
Unsatisfactory 
 
Uncertain Outcome  
 
Unsatisfactory  
 
Highly Satisfactory 
 
Satisfactory 
 
B: Single 
institution 
revenue  
Semi-autonomous 
revenue agency   
Strong 
 
Partial 
 
Satisfactory 
 
Unsatisfactory 
 
Satisfactory  
 
Uncertain Outcome  
 
 Satisfactory 
 
Satisfactory 
 
C. Narrowest 
reform  
Small Enclave  
LTU  
Strong 
 
Partial 
Partial 
/Satisfactory  
 
Unsatisfactory 
 
Satisfactory  
 
Uncertain Outcome   
 
Satisfactory 
 
Satisfactory 
 
Adapted from: Pedersen  and Levy  
 
.   
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